Far China Station - Robert Erwin Johnson

Far China Station is concerned with the history of the U.S. Navy in Asian waters during the 19^th Century. It’s about the Asiatic Fleet when it was only a wee Squadron, and sometimes not even that. The original idea was that the U.S. wanted the right to trade with the various kingdoms in East Asia, and felt a naval presence would either impress/intimidate those kingdoms into granting said rights, or would provide security to protect American citizens and trade once the agreements were established.

The U.S.’s interest in maintaining this effort waxes and wanes with the economic situation, as well as the desires of whoever is President, and the interests of the person named Secretary of the Navy, which could range from modernizing and expanding the Navy, to trying to cut costs. One of Grant’s short-lived appointments seemed largely invested in changing the names of the ships, as his predecessor liked using Native American names from the New England region. As it is, the Squadron rarely exceeds a half-dozen ships, and anywhere from 1 to 5 of those may be incapacitated with some boiler issue, or rotting timbers, or cholera, or smallpox, or one of them is en route to Panama to disembark sailors whose tours have ended. And they’re expected to protect American interests over an area that eventually ranges from Indonesia (then the Dutch East Indies) to Japan.

That’s in theory. In practice, the Squadron sticks largely to China, and later Japan (which has a much more pleasant summer climate, no small thing for a bunch of guys crammed in an old ship with no A.C.), because there aren’t many Americans to protect anywhere else, and most American shipping is traveling on vessels registered under other nations’ flags (something about insurance rates during the Civil War). One of the commanders is ordered to sail his flagship – the only useable vessel he has at the time – to the Dutch East Indies to ‘show the flag’, as they haven’t in some time. He does so, but notes there’s only one port – Batavia – that can even accommodate his ship, and outside of that town, there are no Americans, or American consuls, so really no need to subject his flagship’s boilers to a 6500 mile trip.

It helps there are so many European nations with vested interests in the region, especially China, and so they all have naval forces there, the British in particular. When there are movements against foreigners and it appears the Chinese government may not be able to keep the foreigners safe, the U.S. typically throws one or two ships in with everyone else’s to do the job. For the most part, though, the Asiatic Squadron doesn’t do a lot of shooting. The U.S. is pretty careful about proclaiming neutrality, and while a couple of commanders bend that pretty far – one uses his ships to tow British longboats to shore so they can send detachments of marines to attack Chinese forts – the U.S. largely doesn’t throw their weight behind one side or the other. There’s a fair amount of self-interest there – the Chinese government had guaranteed them most favored nation trade status, so they have no real interest in upsetting that – but it’s more restraint than I’d expect.

It isn’t all pleasantries and diplomatic channels. The U.S. basically forces its way into China, Japan, and Korea at different times to set up trade agreements. The Squadron doesn’t typically fire first, but they aren’t above taking action that can provoke fire, which can provide an excuse to fire back. When their initial attempts to open channels with Korea failed (Korea was in an isolationist phase), they sent a couple of gunboats upriver, ostensibly to survey, which is pretty rude. So some forts opened fire, and the gunboats fired back, and disembarked troops, who captured and burned the forts. Then the ships left, because it wasn’t as though they had the manpower, firepower, or provisions to wage a war, nor the OK to do so. That wasn’t so great, and ultimately the U.S. needed Japan to put in a good word for them to get anywhere with Korea.

There’s a lot more in the book I haven’t gone into, including how much of a revolving door the command seems to be. No one is there for more than 2 or 3 years typically, either because they hate the place, they die, they reach mandatory retirement, a consul complains about them to the right person. With that kind of instability, I’m surprised anything was accomplished at all.

‘Although steam propulsion for ships had become practical early in the 19^th century, navies were reluctant to adopt it. Even as late as 1851, the U.S. Navy had only a half-dozen steamers in commission, one of which, the new paddle frigate Susquehanna, was ordered to the East India Station.

On few stations was steam so important. The activities of sailing vessels in the Far East had always to be planned with the monsoon season in mind, for prevailing unfavorable winds could lengthen a ship’s passage by months. With the growing importance of the treaty ports, most of which were located on rivers and some distance from the sea, a warship able to make her way against the current in the absence of a fair wind was obviously desirable. And, as Commodore David Geisinger had pointed out, effective action against the piratical craft infesting the Canton River estuary and contiguous waters was almost impossible without shallow-draft steamers.'