Carlos de la Torre's book is mostly focused on populist movements in Ecuador, but he compares and contrasts with other Latin American countries. He feels that "populism" is used to describe such a wide range of movements that the meaning is almost lost, and so tries to define specific characteristics of populist movements.
He argues that there is a framing of the struggle in stark terms of those with the movement and the "other", who are entirely immoral and evil and can't be reasoned or compromised with. That whoever are the current elites of the country are positioned as that other, in contrast to those who are seen or feel they lack power. The leader will argue the characteristics of the neglected or excluded are good qualities, all strengths and no flaws, while the other are entirely the opposite. And the leader will position himself as the one who speaks for the dispossessed, focusing less on policy he will enact in his speeches or public appearances, and more on how he is the one who will give the people what they deserve.
I spent a lot of this book comparing de la Torre's definition to Trump. He discusses in the book that the mistake historians often try to make is imposing their view of European democracy on Latin American democracy, without allowing for societal or cultural differences. So maybe trying to draw a comparison between what he describes and Trumpism is a mistake, but a lot of it seemed to fit.
He looks into the rise of both Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra's rise to the presidency in 1944, the beneficiary of a movement he didn't even lead (as he was living in exile at the time), and Abdala Bucaram's brief reign as President in the mid-1990s. These are both ultimately failed populist movements, as neither man retained power for very long, Bucaram being ousted under questionably legal methods roughly six months into his term (Congress had him declared insane and thus unfit for his position). Velasco lasted a few years, and then after being driven out, was elected president three more times over the next 30 years, but never seemed to last for long.
These failures are contrasted with more successful movements. Successful in the sense the leader retained power, not in the sense the goals of the people were truly met. One of de la Torre's arguments is that the successful populist leader, once in charge, turns on the people who got him there, or at least doesn't enact policies to help. Instead, he focuses on forming clientalist relationships with those who can help keep them in power. Alberto Fujimori made an ally of Peru's military by pardoning its soldiers of human rights violations and granting them wide leeway to suppress dissent, including by the same people who got Fujimori elected. Which meant the military had his back. Bucaram didn't do this - he assigned the military an extra responsibility, but not one they apparently wanted - and they weren't on his side.
The book's written in a very dry style, with lots of focus on citations and analyzing other literature on the topic. The conclusions other writers drew, what de la Torre sees as their shortcomings or gaps. It feels like it was originally a dissertation (and the back lists it as No. 32 in a series from Ohio University on Research in International Studies, so that tracks. It's only about 180 pages, though, so it's a quick enough read to not devolve into a slog.
'Populist discourse and rhetoric divide society into two ethically antagonistic fields: el pueblo and la oligarquia. These terms do not refer to precise social categories but rather to a series of social relations; thus it is essential to examine who is included and excluded in each specific case of populism.'
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