This Wasn't As Engrossing As I Hoped

I can't say precisely what I was expecting from Michael Howard's The Continental Commitment. I think I was hoping for something along the line of Luttwak's book on the defense strategy of the Roman Empire, where there'd be a tactical discussion of how the British deployed their forces over the first half of the 20th Century. Unfortunately, it turned out to be a book more about policy, politicking, and funding issues. Which are the forces that underlie decisions about how to deploy, but are not typically as interesting to me.

Which isn't to say the book is a total bore. The British Empire finds itself in a position where it has these vast holdings all over the globe, and prides itself in this measure of its power, but at the same time, trying to protect the various Dominions simultaneously is a real pain in the ass. They start to realize their Fleet can't provide the defense Australia and New Zealand are demanding, and protect Egypt from the Ottomans, the Germans, the Italians, the Russians (the threat varies over the years), and protect India from an overland attack by the Russians/Soviets. Still, they do a good enough job of it that the Dominions send troops to help fight on the Western Front. That's good news. Oh wait, the leaders of those lands aren't happy with how their countrymen are being thrown away, and want to have a say in the tactical discussion. Then after the war, several of the Dominions make it clear they don't want anything to do with any more European conflicts. Not a good turn of events, as the Empire largely becomes more trouble than it's worth.

One part I found especially interesting was the reason for the sluggish build-up of the British Armed Forces, which ties into the tendency to appease the fascist powers. Partially, it seems to have been an attitude of "Never Again", as Howard puts it. The other aspect is that at any given moment, the British seemed acutely aware of the fact that Germany was stronger militarily than they were, so the British didn't wish to agitate them, for fear of getting into a war. They took "not agitating" to the extent of not doing nearly enough to close the gap in military strength, because they were worried that a build-up of their forces would lead to hostility. So they're afraid to get in a fight, but aren't willing to get themselves better prepared in case that starts the fight. I don't suppose I should poke at them for that policy, since I'm an U.S. citizen, and our response was to close our eyes, cover our ears, and yell "La, la, la, I'm not listening! I can't hear anything you're saying about German aggression!"

I mentioned Luttwak's book back at the beginning of the post, and something in this book did remind me of his work. Off and on through the book, various British officials push for having an army (or Expeditionary Force) ready to come to the aid of France, with the statement that the British frontier is at the Rhine. The idea being that it would be easier to protect Great Britain, if the fighting can be kept on the Continent, and it would certainly limit an opponent's ability to strike from a distance. It reminded me of the strategy Luttwak described as the client state. Where the Romans maintained good diplomatic relations with the lands on their borders, and they served as buffers against more aggressive lands farther out. If those client states could handle the threat themselves, great, but if not, the Romans had time to move their legions there and repel the enemy, without letting actual Roman lands be endangered. In this case, the role of the client state will be played by France and the Low Countries.

Still, it's a dry book. Lots of names of politicians, and Neville Chamberlain (and others) crying poverty in the face of people requesting funds to build more fighter squadrons or whatever, not exciting, but the book is, in that sense, blessedly short (you reach the notes section in less than 150 pages).